We model business relationships exemplified for a (re)insurance market by a bipartite graph which determines the sharing of severe losses. Using Pareto-tailed claims and multivariate regular variation we obtain asymptotic results for the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation. We show that the dependence on the network structure plays a fundamental role in their asymptotic behaviour. As is well-known, if the Pareto exponent is larger than 1, then for the individual agent (re-insurance company) diversification is beneficial, whereas when it is less than 1, concentration on a few objects is the better strategy. The situation changes, however, when systemic risk comes into play. The random network structure has a strong influence on diversification effects, which destroys this simple individual agent's diversification rule. It turns out that diversification is always beneficial from a macro-prudential point of view creating a conflicting situation between the incentives of individual agents and the interest of some superior entity to keep overall risk small. We explain the influence of the network structure on diversification effects in different network scenarios. MSC2010 Subject Classifications: primary: 90B15 secondary: 60G70, 62P05, 91B30, 62E20
Introduction
Over the last years, systemic risk modelling has increasingly taken the fact into account that agents are related through an interwoven network of business relationships, see [6, 9, 14, 15] to mention just a few among a rapidly increasing number of articles on the topic. Yet, the specific nature of the extremal dependence structure between large losses, as they may for example happen in markets for catastrophe insurance, has not yet been taken into account in such models. This paper contributes to filling this gap.
Our model assumes a finite set of agents (re-insurance companies), and a finite set of objects.
We think of each object as a pool of highly dependent risks which cause a severe loss if one common triggering event happens. To give examples, we could think of object 1 as a portfolio of household insurances in a particular hurricane region in the U.S. Object 2 could be a pool of life insurances in Western Europe which might cause a big claim in case an epidemic happens, and Object 3 might be related to an earthquake in Japan. Often, we consider the object claims to be asymptotically stochastically independent, which is not a severe restriction of generality if they either refer to different sources of risk (hurricane vs. fire) or to different geographical regions (earthquake in Japan vs. earthquake in California). If an object is chosen by some agent then it is fully insured. In a realisation of the network, some objects may not be insured, which happens also in reality, e.g. in less developed regions of the world. An object generates a loss with a Pareto-tail if it gets severely damaged. Then the loss is evenly distributed across all agents insuring that object.
Hence we use a bipartite graph as in Figure 1 to model the structure of the (re)insurance market; this model strongly resembles the depiction of the (re)insurance market in Figure 21 of [20] .
While our underlying structure is a bipartite graph of agent-object relationships, we mainly focus on the agents and their exposure in the analysis.
This model is intentionally very simple and does not attempt to capture the minutiae of the
The hierarchical structure of the (re)insurance market as a bipartite graph.
(re)insurance market. In particular the model does not reflect the fact that re-insurers may re-insure one another, potentially leading to spiralling effects, see for example [1] . The reason to exclude this effect is that retrocession nowadays covers just a small fraction of the overall reinsured risk, see [20] , p. 26. Instead our model focuses on the effect of the network between agents and objects on risk assessment.
In this paper we address the following questions: Taking network effects into account, when is it beneficial for an agent to diversify, and when is it beneficial to concentrate on a few objects?
From a macroscopic viewpoint, when is it beneficial to have highly diversified agents, and when would it be beneficial that agents focus only on a few objects instead? Here the benefit is judged according to the Value-at-Risk and Conditional Tail Expectation of both individual agents as well as the whole system which allow us to treat the macro-prudential and the micro-prudential view.
The use of bipartite networks has been successful in the area of common asset holdings, see for example [7, 8] . While [7] assesses price impacts on assets due to shocks to other assets, [8] uses a stylized mechanism to quantify bankruptcy cascades. We will instead concentrate on determining extremal dependence structures of losses with Pareto-tails using the framework of multivariate regular variation. Note that regular variation techniques have already been applied to the problem of portfolio diversification with respect to heavy-tailed risks; see for example [16, 18, 25] . Our results build on this literature and extend it to a systemic setup. While previous research considers standard portfolios of different risk factors without any network structure, we model the whole market of various portfolios and describe their dependence structure, which is determined by the bipartite random graph. In addition, the model assumptions are quite different -in [16, 18, 25] a portfolio of a fixed convex combination of assets is considered -, whereas in our model the objects represent a fixed risk, and then every risk is distributed among different agents in a convex way.
In more detail, our random bipartite graph is constructed as follows. 
(For two functions f and g we write f (t) ∼ g(t) as t → ∞ if lim t→∞ f (t)/g(t) = 1.) We summarize all claims in the vector V = (V 1 , . . . , V d ) and assume that this vector is independent of the random graph construction, while V 1 , . . . , V d may not be independent of each other. Let f i (V j ) be the proportion of the loss of object j which affects agent i. We assume that the loss is evenly distributed across all agents insuring object j, and we indicate that agent i holds some insurance risk on object j by 1(i ∼ j). If deg(j) denotes the number of agents insuring object j, then
Let F i := d j=1 f i (V j ) denote the exposure of agent i and F = (F 1 , . . . , F q ) . We represent the insurance relations through the weighted q × d adjacency matrix A = (A ij ) q,d i,j=1 with
Our model is related to the reinsurance network model in [17] , where the relationship between primary insurers and re-insurers is modelled instead of the relationship between objects and reinsurers; there, an insurer's risky asset is modelled as normally distributed. The crucial difference is that our model includes the heavy-tailed nature of the losses, which requires a completely different treatment.
The Pareto-tails allow us to assess the exposure of an agent, the vector of exposures of all agents as well as the aggregated exposures, defined by the norm of the exposure vector. Here and throughout the paper · is a norm in R d or R q such that all canonical unit vectors have norm 1.
We will show at the end of Section 3 that the effect of the network structure on the Value-at-Risk and the Conditional Tail Expectation, given the tail index α of the Pareto-tailed claims, is solely contained in the constants
when the Pareto-tailed claims are independent; the superscript i indicates the individual setting of agent i, whereas S refers to the systemic setting. We contrast this with the fully dependent case.
, the corresponding quantities are
where 1 is the d−dimensional vector with entries all equal 1. In general, small constants are more desirable, indicating a smaller risk. The case of fully dependent claims is equivalent to having a single source of loss, but the loss to be unevenly distributed among the agents.
As [16, 18, 25] , we find that if α > 1 then for every individual agent diversification is beneficial, whereas in the case that α < 1, concentration on a few objects is the better strategy for individual agents. In contrast, in the macroscopic system when all agents are considered jointly, diversification is always beneficial. Hence the network approach reveals a conflicting situation between the incentives of individual agents and the interest of some superior entity to keep overall risk small.
Our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 collates results from multivariate regular variation.
In Section 3 we review and derive specific asymptotic results for the regular variation of F under a general dependence structure for V , and then we consider the special cases that V has asymptotically independent components, and that V has asymptotically fully dependent components. We apply our results to the risk measures Value-at-Risk and Conditional Tail Expectation. Finally, Section 4 gives some examples for bipartite network models and discusses the effect of the network on the risk measures. This section also includes recommendations relating to diversification.
Preliminaries from multivariate regular variation
Our framework will be regular variation of the random vector of exposures F , which follows from the Pareto-tailed claims and the dependence structure introduced by the bipartite graph. We start with a set of equivalent definitions; cf. Theorem 6.1 of [23] , and Ch. , such that tD is bounded away from zero and µ(∂tD) = 0 for t in a dense subset T of (0, ∞) and
In that case there exists some α > 0 such that the limit measure is homogeneous of order −α:
for every S ∈ B(E) satisfying µ(∂S) = 0. The measure µ is called intensity measure of X. Note that µ has no atoms.
(ii) There is a Radon measure ν ≡ 0 on B and a sequence b n → ∞ so that
The measure ν is homogeneous of the same order α as µ in (i), and is called the exponent measure of X.
(iii) There is a probability measure ρ ≡ 0 on B(S d−1 + ) such that for some α > 0
for every u > 0. The index α is the same as in (i) and (ii). The measure ρ is called the spectral measure of X.
The tail index α > 0 is also called the index of regular variation of X, and we write X ∈ R(−α).
The measures µ, ν and ρ all assess the dependence structure of the multivariate vector X in the limit. There is a certain choice in the normalization of the left hand sides of (2.1) (the choice of D) and (2.2) (the choice of b n ). As an example consider the one-dimensional case of a Pareto-tail as in (1.1). If we choose b n ∼ (K 1 n) 1/α , then
Alternatively, we can choose b n ∼ n 1/α and obtain
We will use the second normalization, applying the same b n to each vector component of V , and retain the different constants K j in the limit.
The two extreme dependence cases correspond to vectors with asymptotically independent and with asymptotically fully dependent components (e.g. a vector with the same random variable in each component). In these cases all measures µ, ν, ρ have support on the axes (in the independent case) and on the line {sK 1/α 1 : s > 0} (in the fully dependent case). We summarize some results about the two cases, presenting a multivariate version of (2.4); cf. Section 6.5.1 in [23] .
Lemma 2.2. Assume that the vector V := (V 1 , . . . , V d ) , whose components have Pareto-tails as in (1.1), belongs to R(−α). Define b n := n 1/α and let x = (x 1 , . . . , x d ) . Then the exponent measure ν from (2.2) of V is given by
if the components of V are asymptotically independent, and
, then all component have the same Pareto-tail
If we denote by ν * the exponent measure of V * , then by (6.31) and (6.32) of [23] 
To obtain the exponent measure of V we summarize the different coefficients in the diagonal matrix
giving (a) and (b) above.
.
see [23] , p. 175. Consequently,
Additionally, employing Lemma 6.1 from [23] and noting the relative compactness of { x > 1},
Putting relations (2.5) and (2.6) together leads to
which gives (a) and (b).
In order to prove (c) and (d) we have to calculate the specific form of ν({ x > 1}) for our vector V . Denote by ν * the exponent measure of (K
, and recall the matrix
Then for the asymptotically independent case we calculate
and for the asymptotically fully dependent case we obtain with (1.1)
3 Regular variation of F
We assume the vector V of claims to be multivariate regularly varying with tail index α, which is for example trivially the case if the marginals have Pareto-tails with tail index α (as in (1.1)) and are either asymptotically independent or fully dependent. We now turn to the multivariate vector F = AV of exposures of all agents. In this section, we determine the dependence measures of F , the asymptotics of probabilities of joint marginal exceedances as well as the asymptotics of exceedances of the aggregated vector F in form of a norm of F , all in dependence of the law of the random matrix A representing the market structure. We then apply our findings to Value-at-Risk and Conditional Tail Expectations as tools for risk management. We start with some notation.
Recall that · denotes again a norm on R d or R q satisfying e j = 1 for all unit vectors. We denote the cone
The support of the random matrix A is
Further, for x ∈ R q we recall that the Hamming distance between x and 0 is given by
The following result, based on Proposition A.1 of [4] , ensures regular variation of F = AV . Note that we use a different normalization compared to [4] .
) and exponent measure ν as in (2.2) (with b n = n 1/α ). Then the random vector F = AV as in (1.3) belongs to R(−α). Moreover, the following assertions hold:
(a) For all u > 0
where the intensity measure of F is given by
where the spectral measure of F is given by
it is a probability measure on the sphere S q−1 + .
Proof. (a) Proposition A.1 of [4] ensures that F ∈ R(−α) and that
This implies
as well as
which gives (3.2). Moreover, we calculate
which gives the homogeneity.
(b) is a consequence of (3.1) and (3.2). are asymptotically independent. Then the spectral measure ρ of F has support given by
i.e., ρ is concentrated on at most 2 q −1 many points on the sphere. Setting
Proof. Recall that, by independence, the spectral measure of V is concentrated on the intersections of the sphere with the axes. Hence, the spectral measure ρ of F is concentrated on
hence, (3.5) follows. To prove (3.6), we use that ν and µ are concentrated on the axes and conclude from Lemma 2.3(a),
holds. Consequently, by homogeneity, for b ∈ S,
Next, observe that under the condition Ae j −1 Ae j = b some component of b is not zero if and only if the corresponding component of Ae j is not zero. This implies
and we get the result in view of Proposition 3.1(b).
The support of the spectral measure will also be finite if there is full asymptotic dependence between the claims. are asymptotically fully dependent. Then the spectral measure ρ of F has support
Proof. Since the spectral measure of V is concentrated on K 1/α 1, the spectral measure ρ of F is concentrated on M K 1/α 1 for j = 1, . . . , d and M ∈ supp(A), normalized to live on the sphere. This implies (3.8) . From Lemma 2.3(a) with (d) we conclude,
Using this, we find from Proposition 3.1(d) and (2.3),
giving the spectral measure ρ as above.
We can now present the tails of the exposure of the individual agents.
10)
with C = C i ind = d j=1 K j EA α ij (as in (1.4) ), if V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically independent, and with C i dep = E(AK 1/α 1) α i (as in (1.5)), if V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically fully dependent.
(b) For any subset {i 1 , . . . , i k } of {1, . . . , q} and any choice of positive u 1 , . . . , u k we obtain
11)
in the case of asymptotically independent V 1 , . . . , V d , and 12) in the case of asymptotically fully dependent V 1 , . . . , V d .
(c) For the aggregated exposures F we obtain
Proof. The two relations (3.10) are particular cases of (3.11) and (3.12) . For a proof of (3.11) we note first that by (3.1) and (3.4)
and proceed, using
Incorporating the relation, we find from Lemma 2.
which completes the proof of (3.11).
Relation (3.12) is shown analogously incorporating that the respective exponent measure for fully dependent variables is concentrated on
Relation (3.13) follows from Proposition 3.1(a), if we take into account that
for asymptotically independent and asymptotically fully dependent claims V 1 , . . . , V d .
Remark 3.5. Note that (3.11) indicates that, if different agents i and k do not insure any object jointly, then the joint tail behaviour of F i and F k is asymptotically independent.
Remark 3.6. If q and d are large then the expressions EA α ij and E Ae j α appearing in (1.4) may not be easy to evaluate. Both expressions are expectations of a nonlinear function of the edge indicator variables. Note that
and by the independence of the edges, EA α ij = p ij E(1 + k=1,...,q;k =i 1(k ∼ j)) −1 . We can approximate EA α ij using a Poisson distribution, as follows. We define
and for λ i j = k=1,...,q;k =i p kj let X i ∼ Pois(λ i j ) be a Poisson-distributed random variable with mean λ i j . As k=1,...,q:k =i 1(k ∼ j) is a sum of independent Bernoulli variables, we may invoke Eq. (1.23), p. 8, from [2] to obtain that
Moreover, with the triangle inequaltiy we deduce that
With the function
and λ j = q k=1 p kj as well as random variables X j ∼ Pois(λ j ) we obtain that
The triangle inequality gives
Risk management applications
We investigate now the systemic risk of an insurance market based on the bipartite graph represented by the random matrix A = (A ij ) q,d i,j=1 as in (1.2) with q agents and d objects. Recall that an edge between an agent i and an object j exists with probability p ij .
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a random variable X at confidence level 1 − γ is defined as Note that the Conditional Tail Expectation is also called Expected Shortfall. We consider risk measures of F = AV , where the random matrix A models the network structure of the market.
The claim vector V has Pareto-tailed components, which are assumed to be either asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent. Hence, F is the multivariate regularly varying vector of the joint exposures of the agents in the market as previously.
Instead of attributing a risk measure to an agent's exposure or to the market exposure, we write for short an agent's risk or the market risk. For the VaR we obtain the following. The individual Value-at-Risk of agent i ∈ {1, . . . , q} shows the asymptotic behaviour 
with either C = C S ind or C = C S dep in case V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically independent or asymp-totically fully dependent. The market Conditional Tail Expectation of the aggregated vector F satisfies
. . , V d are asymptotically independent or asymptotically fully dependent.
Proof. Both assertions are consequences of Karamata's Theorem (cf. Theorem 1.6.5 of [5] ) and
Corollary 3.7.
Network effects
In this section we discuss the influence of the graph structure on the risk, which either individual agents or the system as a whole are exposed to. For the sake of clarity and since it is most relevant for the type of insurance market under consideration, we mainly concentrate on the situation that the claim variables V 1 , . . . , V d are asymptotically independent, but we point out some differences to the fully dependent case in Figure 4 . For the remainder of this section we first study some exemplifying network situations and then highlight the observed common features. Throughout this section, · = · r denotes an r−norm for r ∈ [1, ∞] which clearly satisfies e j = 1 for all canonical unit vectors e j , j = 1, ..., d, and which is invariant under permutation of the elements. In particular, we have
Examples
We discuss three quite different models for the probability matrix P = (p ij ) q,d i,j=1 of edge probabilities and investigate the corresponding risk measures specified by the constants in (1.4) and (1.5 ). The first model is a toy model which interpolates between complete specification (one agent insures exactly one object) and full diversification (all agents insure all objects). The second model assumes that all edge probabilities are identical, while the third model is a Rasch-type model, assuming that the edge probabilities result as a product from the propensity of an agent to insure objects and the attractivity of an object. Further models are plausible; exogeneous variables such as location may play a role in that some agents may prefer to insure objects which are in the same geographical location. Of course, our framework also applies to deterministic graphs; i.e., p ij ∈ {0, 1}, and the formulae naturally simplify.
A toy model
As a motivating and introductory example we regard a market structure with three agents and three objects, where the random network is specified by the probability matrix
Observe that the market is completely specified if b = 0 and fully diversified if b = 1. The constants C i ind and C S ind can be regarded as functions of b. We can calculate all expectations by considering all possible realisations of the corresponding vectors. Because of the structure of the matrix P we know that C i ind are identical for i = 1, 2, 3. For agent 1 we get
and we calculate
) . to diversify in order to get a smaller system risk.
Homogeneous probabilities
Now we assume that the probability matrix P has identical entries; i.e., P = (p) q,d i,j=1 and we study the behaviour of C i ind and C S ind as functions of p ∈ [0, 1]. By homogeneity C i ind is the same for all i. We compute 
Since we take as norm x = ( q i=1 x r i ) 1/r for some r ≥ 1, the constant C S dep depends not only on p and the tail index α, but also on the r. Figure 2 depicts C S dep for different norms and two different α.
We observe a quite different behaviour of C S ind from (4.4) in comparison to (4.3) . While in the toy example, increasing b has a positive effect on diversification, we recognize for homogeneous probabilities a non-monotonous behaviour of C S ind in p. This can be explained as follows. In (4.3) every object is insured with probability 1 and the diversification effect starts from the beginning.
In contrast, for homogeneous probabilities and small p only few objects may be insured at all.
Increasing p increases the number of insured objects, assigning also more risk to all agents. This is particularly clear in Figure 2 for the norm with r = 1. The norms with r > 1 reward diversification in the sense of Schur convexity; see p. 80 in [19] . Together with increasing p this leads to nonlinear behaviour. Increasing p increases the risk load on each agent, but the diversification effect also in [12, 18, 24, 25] .
In Figure 3 we explore the influence of different choices of the tail index α on C i ind . We recognize that diversification has a beneficial effect for higher values of p only for α > 1. In particular, we see that a larger tail index (a lighter tail) causes higher values of C i ind for sparser networks, i.e. for lower values of p. The severity of smaller tail indices α only arises for higher connected networks.
At this point, let us also consider the constants C i dep and C S dep ; i.e., the case of fully dependent claim variables. Figure 4 compares both types of network constants depending on the parameter p ∈ [0, 1], on the left hand from a individual agent's perspective and on the right hand from a systemic perspective. A clear difference between the fully dependent and the independent case is that the extent to which the tail index α influences the VaR constants vanishes as the network connectivity increases. We also recognize that over the full range of p ∈ [0, 1], the network constants are larger for larger tail indices α. This relationship holds for independent claims only in the range of intermediate connectedness and reverses as connectivity grows.
Before concluding we explain how to apply Remark 3.6 for this example, when d or q become large. Since p kj = p is constant and K j = 1 for all j, λ i j = (q − 1)p, λ j = qp, and the right hand If the expected degree of an object, qp, is less or equal to 1 then the Poisson approximation is good when p is much smaller than (qd) − 1 3 . If qp > 1 then the Poisson approximation is good when p is much smaller than d − 1 2 .
A Rasch-type model
Random bipartite graphs can also be related to the Rasch models (cf. [21] ) in social science. These are given by taking p ij = β i δ j 1+β i δ j . As a first order approximation of the probabilities in the Rasch model we assume the p ij to be of the form p ij = β i δ j for suitable β i , δ j > 0. The parameter β i gives a measure for the risk proneness of agent i, while the parameter δ j reflects the attractiveness of object j.
For the random bipartite graph with p ij = β i δ j we have
and
(4.6)
We discuss two particular cases.
Example 4.1 (Uniform risk proneness of agents). We take p ij = β i δ j constant in i; i.e., p ij = β δ j .
Then the formulae (4.5) and (4.6) simplify to
For an illustration see Figure 5 , where for the left hand plot we assumed a market situation in which one object is dominantly attractive in contrast to all the others; we choose δ = (1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1), while for the right hand plot, we have a market in which only one object is unattractive opposed to the rest which is very attractive; we choose δ = (0. 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) . Increasing the connectivity of the network by increasing the parameter β of risk proneness of the agents uniformly leads to no observable effect of risk sharing in the left hand plot. This is in contrast to the right hand plot where we can observe beneficial effects of risk sharing because a significant number of the objects have the same attractiveness leading to a market situation quite similar to the homogenous case. Then the formulae (4.5) and (4.6) simplify to
For an illustration, see Figure 6 for the market risk. On the left hand plot, we are in the sitation of having one key player in the market reflected by the choice β = (1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1) opposed to the left hand picture with only one rather inactive player represented by a choice of β = (0.1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1).
While a risk sharing effect is not observable in the left hand plot, it appears clearly in case of the more homogeneous market, as seen in the right hand plot. Figure 7 gives some insight in the univariate case. If only one key player is present, this key player will not benefit from risk sharing, while the players in the rather inactive group finally experience beneficial effects. 
Risk sharing and degree dependence
Here we summarize the findings from studying the different examples in the previous section.
Taking an individual agent's perspective and asking whether a higher degree of connectivity; i.e., a higher degree of risk sharing in the market is preferrable to a lower degree of connectivity; i.e. a lower degree of risk sharing, we find that risk sharing is beneficial whenever the tail index α is greater than 1. However, if α is smaller than one, risk sharing is disadvantageous for the individual agent, see (4.2) or Figure 3 . This observation is in line with results of former studies in different settings like extreme portfolio optimization or operational risk modelling, cf. [13, 16, 18, 25 ]. Yet, these previous studies do not take a network perspective on the whole market in the sense we do.
In contrast to the individual agent's situation, we cannot detect such a twofold behaviour which advocates different strategies depending on whether α < 1 or α > 1, when we take a market, hence, systemic approach and take the network structure into account. are decreasing (see [19] ), and so are the components of the vector
for all α > 0. Let us examine the summands E Ae j α of C S ind in (1.4) . For this we denote the degree distribution of object j by d(j) l = P (object j is chosen by l agents) for l = 0, . . . , q, and
a representation as a linear function of object j's degree distribution d(j). A higher degree of risk sharing in the market is then associated with shifting the mass of d(j) to the higher degrees. Since v α is in decreasing order, this will lower the extent of risk the market faces through object j. So the only point that matters is that the vector v has decreasing components, and taking the power α > 0 to each component does not change this monotonicity in v α . Clearly, if the risk of all objects is shared to a higher extent, this reduces overall risk in the system.
A common network summary is the average degree, where deg(j) = q i=1 1(i ∼ j) denote the degree of object j. One might wonder whether the constants in (1.4) may be described in terms of the summary statistic of average object degree, even in a setting when the network grows. The following example shows that this will not be the case. 
and hence the individual risk constants differ. For the systemic risk constants we use as norm · = · r for arbitrary r > 1. With this norm we have that Both constants have the same factor d with respect to the dimension. The fundamental difference between the risk measures of the two network models is summarized in the two factors of d, which are quite different. Consequently, the average degrees of agents or objects cannot be seen as substitutes for C S ind , neither for finite networks nor in an approximative sense for d, q → ∞.
Diversification benefit
It is well known that for i.i.d. random variables X 1 , . . . , X q ∈ R(−α) the Value-at-Risk is asymptotically subadditive if α > 1 and asymptotically superadditive if α < 1:
VaR 1−γ (X 1 + · · · + X q ) VaR 1−γ (X 1 ) + · · · + VaR 1−γ (X q ) ≥ 1 if α < 1, with equality (additivity) for α = 1 (cf. [11, 12, 13, 18, 24] ). Then D := 1 − lim γ→0 VaR 1−γ (X 1 + · · · + X q ) VaR 1−γ (X 1 ) + · · · + VaR 1−γ (X q ) (4.8)
can be interpreted as a diversification benefit (cf. [10, 12] ). Clearly, in case of D > 0, the VaR is asymptotically subadditive, in case of D < 0, the VaR is asymptotically superadditive, and D = 0 is equivalent to asymptotical additivity of VaR. It is possible to calculate D also for the Conditional Tail Expectation instead of the Value-at-Risk. By Lemma 3.8 the expression for D is exactly the same.
In our context of a multivariate regularly varying vector F , with dependence introduced by the random graph structure, we now discuss the influence of this graph structure on the diversification benefit and the question of additivity. As we recognize in view of Proposition 3.7, insight about the effect of the network structure on the Value-at-Risk and the Expected Shortfall, for the individual as well as the systemic risk, is solely contained in the two constants C i ind and C S ind given in (1.4) where we are now concerned with the l 1 −norm. Calculating the quantity (4.8) using as notation (U indicates the univariate setting and S as before the systemic setting)
(4.9)
Consequently, for a given tail index α, the diversification benefit depends not on the absolute size of the constants C U ind and C S ind 1/α , but on their ratio. Unfortunately, there is neither an ad hoc interpretation of C U ind or C S ind in terms of the network structure available, nor are they computable in a simple way, particularly when dimensions are high; but the Poisson approximation in Remark 3.6 can be employed if the edge probabilities are not too large.
For the toy model (4.1) with r = 1 we calculate D = 1 − 3 1/α 3(1 + b(2 1−α − 1) + b 2 (2 1−α − 1) + b 3 (3 1−α + 1 − 2 2−α )) 1/α . This quantity is plotted in Figure 8 as a function of b, which shows that it increases in b for α < 1 and decreases in b for α > 1, though being negative all the way. This means, that VaR is superadditive, but gets additive for b = 1. For diversification benefit in the Rasch model, see Figure 9 ; the behaviour is qualitatively similar, but in these two examples D does not reach 0.
All of our examples share the feature that an increasing degree of connectivity in the network implies an increasing diversification benefit in the case of α < 1 and a decreasing diversification benefit in the case of α > 1. In case of α = 1, the diversification benefit equals 0 for all degrees of connectivity in the network. If the degree of connectivity reaches its maximum; i.e., in the particular case of a complete bipartite graph when each agent insures each object with probability one, VaR 
